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Technical Appendix to
\Screening When Not All Agents Are Strategic:
Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude?"
Proof of Theorem 2.
Existence. We wish to show that there exists a 4-tuple of measurable bounded functions
fq(µ);ts(µ);g(µ);t¿(µ)g solving the maximization problem (1)-(5).
Note that since the monopolist will never select to sell a quantity larger than Q =
maxfqju(q;1) ¡ c(q) ¸ 0g, consumers will never pay more than M = u(Q;1). Also, without
loss of generality, ts(µ) ¸ 0 and t¿(µ) ¸ 0. Thus we may without loss of generality restrict the
domain of maximization to functions whose range is contained in [0;K] where K = maxfQ;Mg.
The set of measurable functions with range [0;K] coincides with L2(¹), where ¹ is the
measure associated with the distribution function F(:). Let us endow this space of functions with





0 x(µ)y(µ)f(µ)dµ 8y 2 L2(¹). Setting y(µ) ´ 1 then shows that
xn(µ) ¡ x(µ) ! 0, a.e.-µ.
Since c(¢) is continuous, and since the components of fq(µ);ts(µ);g(µ);t¿(µ)g are bounded
by K, it follows from the Lebesgue dominated convergence Theorem that the objective function
is a continuous functional under the weak¤ topology.
By Alaoglu's Theorem (see Theorem 6.17 in Royden \Real Analysis," (1987)) a K-ball is
compact in the weak¤ topology. Furthermore, by Tychono®'s Theorem the product of 4 K-balls
is compact in the product topology generated by the weak¤ topology. Since the set S of all
4-tuples fq(µ);ts(µ);g(µ);t¿(µ)g whose components lie in [0;K] and satisfy the constraints (2)-(5)
is a closed subset of the K-ball, we conclude that S is compact in the product topology generated
by the weak¤ topology. It follows from the Weierstrass Theorem that there exists a 4-tuple of
L2 functions fq(µ);ts(µ);g(µ);t¿(µ)g in S that attains the maximum in (1).
Uniqueness. Since Problem (1)-(5) is equivalent to Problem (6)-(7), we will prove the
uniqueness of a solution to the latter problem.
Suppose to the contrary that there exist two distinct pairs (qi(µ);gi(µ)) i = 1;2 solving
(6)-(7). Fix some ½ 2 (0;1), and let g3(µ) = ½g1(µ) + (1 ¡ ½)g2(µ), q3(µ) = ½q1(µ) + (1 ¡ ½)q2(µ).
Now de¯ne U¿(µ) = maxµ02[0;1] u(g3(µ0);µ)¡u(g3(µ0);µ0), and let µ¤(µ) be the largest corre-
sponding maximizer. Since uµq(q;µ) > 0 and g3(µ) is increasing, the maximand is supermodular in
the choice variable, and so µ¤(µ) is an increasing function. Furthermore, at any point µ where µ¤ is
continuous (which excludes at most a countable number of points), the function U¿ is di®erentiable
with derivative U0
¿(µ) = uµ(g3(µ¤(µ));µ). At any discontinuity point of µ¤ we nevertheless have
limsupµ0#µ
U¿(µ0)¡U¿(µ)





is the left limit of µ¤.
We will show that the following modi¯cation of the quantity schedules (b q(µ);b g(µ)) improves





0 uµ(b q(s);s)ds > U¿(µ)
maxfq3(µ);g3(µ¤(µ))g if
R µ
0 uµ(b q(s);s)ds = U¿(µ)
Let us show that the tuple (b q(µ);g3(µ)) is feasible, i.e. satis¯es the constraints (8) and (7).
(7) holds because b q(µ) is constructed so that whenever U(µ) =
R µ
0 uµ(b q(s);s)ds = U¿(µ) we
have U0(µ) = uµ(b q(µ);µ) ¸ uµ(g3(µ¤(µ));µ) = limsupµ0#µ
U¿(µ0)¡U¿(µ)
µ0¡µ , where the inequality holds
because uµq(q;µ) > 0 and b q(µ) ¸ g3(µ¤(µ)). Thus, whenever U(µ) equals U¿(µ), it cannot decrease
below it.
1To see that (8) holds note that both q3(µ) and maxfq3(µ);g3(µ¤(µ))g are increasing func-
tions. Note that b q(µ) can fail to be increasing only if for some µd U(µd) = U¿(µd), U(µ) > U¿(µ)
in a right neighborhood of µd, and g3(µ¤(µd)) > q3(µd). The latter inequality, the monotonicity
of g3(µ¤(:)); and the continuity of q3(:) would then imply that there exists a right neighbor-




µ0¡µ . This contradicts that U(µ) > U¿(µ) in a right neighborhood of µd.
Let us now show that the objective (6) attains a strictly higher value under (b q(µ);g3(µ))
than under either (q1(µ);g2(µ)) or (q2(µ);g2(µ)). First, note that strict concavity of u(q;µ) ¡ c(q)
implies that u(g3(µ);µ)¡c(g3(µ)) > ½(u(g1(µ);µ)¡c(g1(µ)))+(1¡½)(u(g2(µ);µ)¡c(g2(µ))), and
the corresponding inequality applies to the second term in (6).









Lemmas 6 and 8 imply that ½q1(µ) + (1 ¡ ½)q2(µ) · b q(µ) · q¤(µ). Since u(q;µ) ¡ c(q) is strictly
concave in q, we have u(b q(µ);µ)¡c(b q(µ)) > ½(u(q1(µ);µ)¡c(q1(µ)))+(1¡½)(u(q2(µ);µ)¡c(q2(µ))),
and the corresponding inequality applies to
R 1
0 u(q(µ);µ) ¡ c(q(µ)dµ.
To complete the proof, we only need to show that for all µ 2 [0;1],
Z µ
0
uµ(b q(s);s)ds · ½
Z µ
0




First, suppose µ is such that
R µ
0 uµ(b q(s);s)ds = U¿(µ) ´
R µ
µ¤(µ)) uµ(g3(µ¤(µ));s)ds. Now (3) implies




0 uµ(qi(s);s)ds. Since uµqq(q;µ) ¸ 0,
we also have uµ(g3(µ);µ) · ½uµ(g1(µ);µ) + (1 ¡ ½)uµ(g2(µ);µ), and the desired inequality holds.

















where the inequality follows because q3(µ) = ½q1(µ) + (1 ¡ ½)q2(µ) and uµqq(q;µ) ¸ 0. So, (43)
holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. First, (i) is immediate, as incentive constraints in (2) imply that
q(:) must be nondecreasing. Next we will prove (v), (iii), (ii) and (iv) in that order. Note that our
proof establishes that (iii) and (v) must hold almost everywhere on [0;1]. It also implies that for
every solution in which (iii) and (v) fail on a set of measure zero there is an equivalent solution
which: (a) di®ers on a set of measure zero, (b) generates the same value of (1), (c) in which (iii)
and (v) hold everywhere. Focussing on equivalence classes, there is no loss of generality then to
require that (iii) and (v) hold everywhere.
To establish (v), suppose that t¿(µ) < u(g(µ);µ) for some µ 2 [0;1]. Then the value of
the second integrand in (1) can be increased pointwise by setting t¿(µ) = u(g(µ);µ) at all such µ.
This modi¯cation does not violate any constraints in (2)-(4), and raises the value of (1).
Similarly, if g(µ) > q¤(µ) for some µ 2 [0;1], then the value of the second integrand in
(1) can be increased pointwise by setting g(µ) = q¤(µ) and resetting the corresponding transfer
t¿(µ) so that t¿(µ) = u(g(µ);µ) at all such µ. This modi¯cation does not violate any constraints
in (2)-(4) either.
2Next, suppose that g(µ0) > g(µ00) for some µ0;µ00 2 [0;1], µ0 < µ00. By part (ii) and the
previous argument, t¿(µ) = u(g(µ);µ) and g(µ) · q¤(µ) for all µ 2 [0;1]. So, u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ t¿(µ0) >
u(g(µ00);µ) ¡ t¿(µ00) for all µ ¸ µ0. Also, by (4), u(q(µ);µ) ¡ ts(µ) ¸ 0 > u(g(µ00);µ) ¡ t¿(µ00) for
all µ < µ0. Then let us modify g(µ00) raising it to g(µ0) and also raise t¿(µ00) so that (5) remain
binding. This modi¯cation does not violate any incentive constraints, and raises the value of the
second integrand in (1) pointwise.
Next, we establish (ii). We start by showing that limµ!1 q(µ) = q¤(1), which would
imply that q(1) = q¤(1). So, ¯rst, suppose that q(µ) > q¤(1) for some µ 2 [0;1). Let ^ µ =
inffµjq(µ) > q¤(1)g. Since q(:) is non-decreasing, q(µ) > q¤(1) 8µ 2 (^ µ;1]. Consider a modi¯ed
quantity/transfer schedule (~ q(µ);~ ts(µ)) s.t. ~ q(µ) = q(µ), ~ ts(µ) = ts(µ) if µ 2 [0; ^ µ), and ~ q(µ) = q¤(1),
~ ts(µ) = ts(^ µ)+u(q¤(1); ^ µ)¡u(q(^ µ); ^ µ) if µ 2 [^ µ;1]. It is easy to check that (~ q(µ);~ ts(µ)) satis¯es all
incentive constraints. In particular, all constraints in (3) hold because g(µ) · q¤(1) 8µ 2 [0;1].
Also, (2) imply that ~ ts(µ) > ts(µ) for all µ 2 [^ µ;1]. Since we also have c(~ q(µ)) · c(q(µ)), the ¯rm's
expected pro¯ts strictly increase as a result of this modi¯cation.
Now suppose that limµ!1 q(µ) = ¹ < q¤(1). Since q(µ) is nondecreasing, q(µ) · ¹ 8µ 2
[0;1). Let µm be well-de¯ned by the following equality: u(q¤(µm);µm)¡c(q¤(µm)) = u(¹;1)¡c(¹).
Since ¹ < q¤(1), µm < 1 and q¤(µm) > ¹. So, µm > µ¹ where µ¹ satis¯es q¤(µ¹) = ¹. Therefore,
u(q¤(µm);µm) ¡ c(q¤(µm)) > u(¹;µ) ¡ c(¹) > u(q(µ);µ) ¡ c(q(µ)) 8µ > µm.
Consider a modi¯ed pro¯le (~ q(µ);~ ts(µ)) which coincides with (q(µ);ts(µ)) on [0;µm), while
for µ 2 [µm;1] ~ q(µ) = q¤(µm), ~ ts(µ) = ts(µm)+u(q¤(µm);µm)¡u(q(µm);µm). The pro¯le (~ q(µ);~ ts(µ))
satis¯es all incentive and individual rationality constraints. Moreover, the ¯rm's expected pro¯ts
strictly increase. It earns the same pro¯ts from strategic consumers with valuations in [0;µm),
while its pro¯ts from selling to a consumer with valuation µ > µm changes by:




The proof that it is optimal to set q(0) = 0 proceeds along similar lines.
To establish (iv) note that, since q(µ) is non-decreasing and bounded, it is Riemann
integrable (Theorem 6.9, p.126 in Rudin, \Principles of Mathematical Analysis," (1976)) and
a.e. di®erentiable (Theorem 3 in Royden, p. 100 in \Real Analysis," Third Edition, Prentice
Hall.). Hence, u(q(µ);µ) is also bounded, Riemann integrable and a.e. di®erentiable. Let U(µ) ´
u(q(µ);µ)¡ts(µ). Incentive constraints (2) imply that U(µ) is increasing and satis¯es the following
inequalities 8µ;µ0 2 [0;1]:
u(q(µ0);µ) ¡ u(q(µ0);µ0) · U(µ) ¡ U(µ0) · u(q(µ);µ) ¡ u(q(µ);µ0)
By the intermediate value theorem, 9¸1;¸2 2 [0;1] s.t. uµ(q(µ0);¸1µ + (1 ¡ ¸1)µ0)(µ ¡ µ0) ·
U(µ)¡U(µ0) · uµ(q(µ);¸2µ+(1¡¸2)µ0)(µ¡ µ0). Since, uµ(q(µ0);µ) · maxµ2[0;1] uµ(q¤(1);µ) < 1,
U(µ) is absolutely continuous. Therefore by Theorem 14, p.110 in Royden (1987) we have U0(µ) =
uµ(q(µ);µ) and U(:) is equal to the integral of its derivative, i.e. U(µ) ¡ U(µ0) =
R µ
µ0 uµ(q(s);s)ds.
This equation implies that, as in the standard case, only downwards incentive constraints between
`adjacent' types are binding among the `strategic' consumers whenever q(:) is strictly increasing,
and so ts(µ) = u(q(µ);µ) ¡
R µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds ¡ U(0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since the schedule q(:) is non-decreasing, by Theorems 4.29 and 4.30, p.96
in Rudin, \Principles of Mathematical Analysis," (1976), it has at most countably many points of
discontinuity on [0;1], and both the left-hand and the right-hand limits exist at all discontinuity
points of q(:).
3Suppose that the optimal quantity schedule q(:) is discontinuous at x 2 (0;1). Let q(x¡)
and q+(x) be, respectively, the left-hand and the right-hand limits of q(:) at x. Consequently, we
have q¡(x) = q+(x) ¡ 2± for some ± > 0.
Let G(q;µ) = u(q;µ) ¡ c(q) ¡ uµ(q;µ)
1¡F(µ)
f(µ) and ¢(x) = q+(x) ¡ q¡(x). We will consider
two di®erent cases.
Case 1: G(q¡(x);x) < G(q+(x);x). By continuity of G(q;µ) and f(µ), 9² > 0 s.t. 8µ 2
(x ¡ ²;x), G(q(µ) + ¢(x);µ) > G(q(µ);µ). Then let us replace the schedule q(µ) with modi¯ed
quantity schedule ~ q(µ) s.t. ~ q(µ) = q(µ) 8µ 2 [0;x ¡ ²) [ (x;1], ~ q(µ) = q(µ) + ¢(x) 8µ 2 (x ¡ ²;x)
and ~ q(x) = q+(x). Note that ~ q(µ) is increasing in µ, and all incentive constrains in (7) still hold
because ~ U(µ) ¸ U(µ) 8µ 2 [0;1]. At the same time, the value of the objective (6) increases.
Case 2: G(q¡(x);x) ¸ G(q+(x);x). By concavity of G(q;µ) in q, G((q¡(x)+q+(x))=2;x) >
G(q¡(x);x)=2 + G(q+(x);x)=2. Furthermore, by continuity of G(q;µ) and f(µ), 9² > 0 s.t.
8µ 2 (x¡²;x), G((q¡(x)+q+(x))=2;µ)f(µ)+G((q¡(x)+q+(x))=2;µ+²)f(µ+²) > G(q(µ);µ)f(µ)+
G(q(µ + ²);µ + ²)f(µ + ²).
So, let ~ q(µ) = q(µ) 8µ 2 [0;x¡²][[x+²;1] and ~ q(µ) = (q¡(x)+q+(x))=2 8µ 2 (x¡²;x+²).
Note that ~ q(µ) is increasing in µ. If uµ((q¡(x) + q+(x))=2;x)) > uµ(q¡(x);x)=2 + uµ(q+(x);x)=2,
then ² can be chosen small enough that 8µ 2 (x¡²;x), uµ(q¡(x)+q+(x))=2;µ)f(µ)+uµ(q¡(x)+
q+(x))=2;µ + ²)f(µ + ²) > uµ(q(µ);µ)f(µ) + uµ(q(µ + ²);µ + ²)f(µ + ²). So under the quantity
schedule ~ q(µ), ~ U(µ) ´
R µ
0 uµ(~ q(s);s)ds ¸ U(µ) ´
R µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds 8µ 2 [0;1]. The value of (6)
changes by: Z x+²
x¡²
(G((q¡(x) + q+(x))=2;µ) ¡ G(q(µ);µ))f(µ)dµ > 0
If uµ((q¡(x)+q+(x))=2;x)) · uµ(q¡(x);x)=2+uµ(q+(x);x)=2, then it is possible that ¢U(x+ ²) = R x+²
x¡² uµ(~ q(s);s)¡uµ(q(µ);s)ds < 0. In this case, 8µ 2 (x¡²;x+²) set ~ q(µ) = ~ q s.t.
R x+²
x¡² uµ(~ q;s)¡
uµ(q(µ);s)ds = 0. Note that ~ q > (q¡(x)+q+(x))=2. If ² is su±ciently small, then the value of the
Problem (6) changes approximately by:
Z x+²
x¡²
(u(~ g;µ) ¡ c(~ g) ¡ u(q(µ);µ) + c(q(µ)))f(µ)dµ > 0
The inequality holds by concavity of u(µ;q) ¡ c(q) and the fact that ~ q > (q¡(x) + q+(x))=2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that sequence fµngn=1
n=1 is s.t. limn!1 u(g(µn);µ2)¡u(g(µn);µn) =
U¿(µ2) and limn!1 g(µn) = ¹ g2. (Such a sequence exists because g(µ) 2 [0;q¤(1)] 8µ 2 [0;1], and
any sequence in a compact set has a converging subsequence.) Then ¹ g2 > g. For suppose not, i.e.
¹ g2 · g. Then
U¿(µ2) ¡ U¿(µ1) · lim
n!1
u(g(µn);µ2) ¡ u(g(µn);µ1) = u(¹ g2;µ2) ¡ u(¹ g2;µ1) < u(g;µ2) ¡ u(g;µ1)
Contradiction.
Next, consider a sequence fµmgm=1
m=1 s.t. limm!1 u(g(µm);µ3) ¡ u(g(µm);µm) = U¿(µ3)
and limm!1 g(µm) = ¹ g3. Then ¹ g3 > g. Again, suppose otherwise i.e. ¹ g3 · g. We have:
U¿(µ3) = lim
m!1u(g(µm);µ3) ¡ u(g(µm);µm) ¸ lim
n!1u(g(µn);µ3) ¡ u(g(µn);µn)
Since ¹ g3 < ¹ g2 by assumption, it follows that 9N;M s.t. 8n ¸ N and m ¸ M, g(µm) < g(µn), and
so u(g(µm);µ2) ¡ u(g(µn);µ2) > u(g(µm);µ3) ¡ u(g(µn);µ2).
4But then limm!1 u(g(µm);µ2) ¡ u(g(µm);µm) > limn!1 u(g(µn);µ2) ¡ u(g(µn);µn) =
supµ02[0;1] u(g(µ2);µ0) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0). Contradiction. Finally, we have:
U¿(µ4) ¡ U¿(µ3) ¸ lim
m!1
u(g(µm);µ4) ¡ u(g(µm);µ3) = u(¹ g3;µ4) ¡ u(¹ g3;µ1) > u(g;µ4) ¡ u(g;µ3)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose that in the optimal mechanism U(0) = u > 0. Consider set Z ½ £






u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0) (44)
The set Z is non-empty, because otherwise the ¯rm could reduce U(0) and hence increase its
expected pro¯ts without violating any of the incentive constraints in (7). Let ^ µ be the minimal el-
ement of Z. ^ µ exists because both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (44) are continuous
in µ.
De¯ne U¿(µ) ´ supµ02[0;1] u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0). Note that U¿(µ) is continuous and
strictly increasing in µ. Since g(µ) · q¤(1) 8µ, jU¿(µ1) ¡ U¿(µ2)j · jµ1 ¡ µ2jmaxµ2[0;1] u(µ;q¤(1)),
U¿(µ) is absolutely continuous. Hence, it is almost everywhere di®erentiable and has ¯nite left-
hand and right-hand derivatives for all µ 2 [0;1].
Now, let us demonstrate that the ¯rm can strictly increase its expected pro¯ts by o®ering
a modi¯ed quantity schedule ~ q(µ) and setting U(0) = 0. To de¯ne ~ q(µ), let g¡(µ) denote the
left-hand limit of g(:) at µ (such limit exists 8µ 2 [0;1] since g(:) is increasing and bounded), and








We will show that there exists µ0 2 [0;µm] s.t. V (µ0) = u +
R ^ µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds. Note that V (µ) is
continuous in µ0 and V (0) =
R ^ µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds < u +
R ^ µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds.
Next, let us establish that V (µm) ¸ U¿(^ µ). Note that V (µm) =
R µm
0 uµ(maxfg(s);q(s)g;s)ds+
u(q(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ u(q(^ µ);µm). Since g(:) is nondecreasing,
R µ
0 uµ(maxfg(s);q(s)g;s)ds ¸ U¿(µ) 8µ 2
[0;µm].
Since U0(^ µ) = uµ(q(^ µ); ^ µ) and ^ µ satis¯es (44), there exists ^ ± > 0 s.t. U¿(^ µ + ±) ¡ U¿(^ µ) ·
u(q(^ µ); ^ µ + ±) ¡ u(q(^ µ); ^ µ) for all ± · ^ ±. Otherwise, 9± small enough that U¿(^ µ + ±) > U(µ). By
Lemma 3, this implies that U¿(^ µ) ¡ U¿(µm) · u(q(^ µ); ^ µ) ¡ u(q(^ µ);µm), and so V (µm) ¸ U¿(^ µ).
Hence, by continuity of V (µ), 9µ0 2 [0;µm] s.t. V (µ0) = U¿(^ µ).
Set ~ q(µ) = maxfg(µ);q(µ)g 8µ 2 [0;µ0), ~ q(µ) = maxfg¡(µ0);q(µ)g 8µ 2 [µ0; ^ µ], and ~ q(µ) =
q(µ) 8µ 2 [^ µ;1]. Let ~ U(µ) =
R µ
0 u(q(s);s)ds. Then, clearly, ~ U(µ) ¸ U¿(µ) 8µ 2 [0;µ0]. Also,
~ U(µ) = U(µ) ¸ U¿(µ) 8µ 2 [µe;1] where µe = supfµjq(µ) < g¡(µ0)g. Note that µe · ^ µ.
Suppose that 9µl 2 (µ0;µe) s.t. ~ U(µl) < U¿(µl). Then we have ~ U(µl) ¡ ~ U(µ0) < U¿(µl) ¡
U¿(µ0). Note that q(µ) = g¡(µ0) and so ~ U0(µ) = uµ(g¡(µ0);µ) 8µ 2 [µ0;µe]. So, by Lemma 3
~ U(µe) ¡ ~ U(µl) < U¿(µe) ¡ U¿(µl), i.e. U¿(µe) > ~ U(µe). Contradiction.
When the ¯rm implements quantity schedule ~ q(µ) rather than q(µ), sets U(0) = 0, and




(u(~ q(µ);µ) ¡ u(q(µ);µ))f(µ)dµ ¡
Z 1
0
(uµ(~ q(µ);µ) ¡ uµ(q(µ;µ))(1 ¡ F(µ))dµ =
Z 1
0
(u(~ q(µ);µ) ¡ u(q(µ);µ))f(µ)dµ +
Z 1
0
(uµ(~ q(µ);µ) ¡ uµ(q(µ;µ))F(µ)dµ > 0
The equality follows from the fact that ~ U(1) = U(1). The inequality follows because both terms
in the expression on the second line are positive. The second term is positive because ~ q(µ) ¸ q(µ)
8µ 2 [0;1]. The ¯rst term is positive, because it is also true that ~ q(µ) · g(µ) · q¤(1) whenever
~ q(µ) > q(µ). So, since u(q;µ) is quasiconcave in q, u(~ q(µ);µ) ¡ u(q(µ);µ) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. (i) Suppose that 9µa 2 (0;1] s.t. q(µa) < qsb(µa). Let µb = supfµjq(µ) <
qsb(µ)g. By continuity of q(:), µb > µa. Then the ¯rm can strictly increase its pro¯ts by o®ering
a modi¯ed quantity schedule qn(:) s.t. qn(µ) = q(µ) 8µ 2 [0;µa) [ (µb;1] and qn(µ) = qsb(µ)
8µ 2 [µa;µb] and adjusting the transfers to preserve the incentive compatibility. Inspecting (6)
and (7), one can see that this modi¯cation does not violate any incentive constraints and leads
to an increase in the value of the objective function (6).
(ii) If 9µm s.t. q(µ) > q¤(µ), 8µ 2 (µm;1), and either q(µm) · q¤(µ) or µm = 0, then
the ¯rm can increase its expected pro¯ts by replacing the quantity schedule q(:) with qa(:) s.t.
qa(µ) = q(µ) 8µ 2 [0;µm) and qa(µ) = q¤(µ) 8µ 2 [µm;1].
Since g(µ) · q¤(µ), inspection of (7) reveals that after this modi¯cation all incentive
constraints in (7) continue to hold. Inspecting (6) one can also see that as a result of this
modi¯cation the value of the ¯rst integral goes up, while the second remains unchanged.
It remains to consider the following case: there exist µ1;µ2 s.t. q(µ) · q¤(µ) 8µ 2 [µ2;1],
q(µ) > q¤(µ) 8µ 2 (µ1;µ2), and at least one is true: q(µ1) = q¤(µ1) or µ1 = 0. Note that by
continuity q(µ2) = q¤(µ2).
Let us construct a modi¯ed quantity schedule qa(:) in the following way: qa(µ) = q(µ)










then set qa(µ) = q¤(µ) 8µ 2 (µ2; ^ µ] and qa(µ) = maxfq¤(^ µ);q(µ)g 8µ 2 (^ µ;1]. Otherwise, if the
left-hand side of (45) is strictly smaller than its right-hand side 8µ 2 [µ2;1], then set qa(µ) = q¤(µ)
8µ 2 (µ2;1].
Leaving the quantity schedule g(:) unmodi¯ed, we need to establish two claims. Claim
1: all incentive constraints (7) still hold after this modi¯cation. Claim 2: this modi¯cation leads
to an increase in the ¯rm's expected pro¯ts given by (6).
To establish Claim 1, consider µ3 = supfµjµ ¸ ^ µ;q(µ) < q¤(^ µ)g. Then 8µ 2 [0;µ1)[[µ3;1],
Ua(µ) ´
R µ
0 uµ(qa(s);s)ds = U(µ) ´
R µ
0 uµ(q(s);s)ds. So, (7) holds 8µ 2 [0;µ1) [ [µ3;1] under qa(:)
because it holds under q(:).
Next suppose that µ 2 [µ1; ^ µ]. Then qa(µ) = minfq¤(µ);q¤(^ µ)g. Then, since g(µ0) · q¤(µ0)
and qa(µ) ¸ q¤(µ1), the inequality U(µ1) ¸ u(g(µ0);µ1) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0) 8µ0 2 [0; ^ µ] implies that
U(µ) ¸ u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0) 8µ 2 [µ1; ^ µ] and µ0 2 [0;µ1].
Similarly, 8µ0 2 [µ1;µ3], we have U(µ) ¸
R µ
µ0 uµ(q¤(s);s)ds ¸ u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0). It
also follows immediately that U(µ) ¸ u(g(µ0);µ) ¡ u(g(µ0);µ0) 8µ0 2 (^ µ;µ3) if µ0 2 (^ µ;µ3) and
g(µ0) · q¤(^ µ).
6Finally, if µ 2 (^ µ;µ3) and µ0 2 (^ µ;µ3) and g(µ0) > q¤(^ µ), we can use U(µ3) ¸ u(g(µ0);µ3) ¡
u(g(µ0);µ0) and qa(µ) = q¤(^ µ) 8µ 2 [^ µ;µ3] to show that U(µ) ¸ u(g(µ0);µ)¡u(g(µ0);µ0). So, all the
incentive constraints (7) hold when we replace q(:) with qa(:).




0 (u(qa(µ);µ) ¡ c(qa(µ))f(µ)dµ, because u(q(µ);µ) ¡ c(q(µ)) · u(qa(µ);µ) ¡ c(qa(µ)), 8µ 2 [0;1]
and the inequality is strict 8µ 2 (µ1;µ2). If there exists ^ µ satisfying (45), then we have:
Z 1
0
(uµ(qa(µ);µ) ¡ uµ(q(µ);µ))(1 ¡ F(µ))dµ =
Z µ3
µ1
(uµ(minfq¤(µ);q¤(^ µ)g;µ) ¡ uµ(q(µ);µ))(1 ¡ F(µ))dµ
· (1 ¡ F(µ2))
Z µ3
µ1
(uµ(minfq¤(µ);q¤(^ µ)g;µ) ¡ uµ(q(µ);µ))dµ = 0
where the ¯rst equality holds by de¯nition of qa(:), the inequality holds because minfq¤(µ);q¤(^ µ)g =
q¤(^ µ) > q(µ) 8µ 2 (µ1;µ2) and minfq¤(µ);q¤(^ µ)g = q¤(^ µ) < q(µ) 8µ 2 (µ2;µ3), and the last equality
holds by (45). The same result obtains if there is no ^ µ satisfying (45). To see this simply replace ^ µ
by 1. After this modi¯cation the value of the ¯rst integral in (6) increases, i.e. the ¯rm's expected
pro¯ts go up. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose that q(µ) is a solution to Problem (17) on the domain C1
p([0;1]),
but there exists an admissible schedule ^ q(µ) 2 C([0;1]) n C1
p([0;1]) s.t. the objective function in
(17) takes a strictly higher value under ^ q(µ) than under q(µ).
By the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, the space of continuously di®erentiable functions C1([0;1]),
which is a subspace of C1
p([0;1]) is dense in C([0;1]). Therefore, C1
p([0;1]) is dense in C([0;1]).
So, there exists a sequence ~ qn(µ) 2 C1
p([0;1]) converging to ^ q(µ) in the sup¡norm. The objective
function (17) is continuous in the sup-norm. Therefore, 9N > 0 s.t. 8n ¸ N (17) takes a strictly
higher value under ~ qn(µ) than under q(µ). This contradicts the hypothesis that q(µ) is a solution
on C1
p([0;1]). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10. The Lemma will be established in a sequence of steps.
Step 1. 9µ1;µ2 2 [0;1], µ1 < µ2, s.t. Case 1 applies i.e. q(µ) < q¤(r(µ)) on (µ1;µ2).
For suppose not. Then by continuity, q(µ) ¸ q¤(r(µ)) 8µ 2 [0;1]. This implies that for
any µ s.t. q0(µ) > 0, q(µ) is given by the solution to (36) with some constant of integration k2.
Since q(1) = q¤(1), (36) implies that k2 = 0. Then, however, (36) cannot hold as an
equality near µ = 0 if q(µ) > 0 8µ > 0. To see this, recall that uq(q;0) = 0 8q ¸ 0, and so uq(q;µ) =
R µ
0 uqµ(q;s)ds. Therefore, uq(0;µ) < uµq(0;µ)
1¡F(µ)
f(µ) when µ is su±ciently small. Consequently, µ0
solving uq(0;µ0) = uµq(0;µ0)
1¡F(µ0)
f(µ0) is strictly positive, and we must have q(µ) = 0 8µ · µ0.
Step 2. 9µl 2 (0;1) s.t. q(µ) < q¤(r(µ)), i.e. Case 1 applies, on (0;µl).
Suppose not. Then 9µa;µb 2 (0;1], s.t. Case 2 applies on (0;µa) and Case 1 applies on
(µa;µb). So, q(µa) = q¤(r(µa)). Since r(µa) < µa, we have uq(q(µa);µa) > uq(q(µa);r(µa)) =
c0(q(µa)). Hence, since (36) holds on (0;µa), the constant of integration k2 on this interval
needs to satisfy k2 > ¡1. Therefore, by the same argument as in Step 2, ~ µ solving uq(0; ~ µ) =
uµq(0; ~ µ)
1+k2¡F(~ µ)
f(~ µ) is strictly positive, and we must have q(µ) = 0 8µ · ~ µ. Contradiction.
Step 3. 9µn 2 (µl;1) s.t. q(µ) > q¤(r(µ)), i.e. Case 2 applies, on (µn;1).
Since r(µ) < µ 8µ 2 (0;1], we have q¤(r(µ)) · q¤(r(1)) < q¤(1) = q(1). Then by continuity
of q(:) it follows that q¤(r(µ)) < q(µ) for all µ su±ciently close to 1. This establishes the result.
7Step 4. 9µh 2 [µn;1) s.t. q(:) is strictly increasing on [µh;1).
Suppose otherwise. Since by Lemma (1) q(1) = q¤(1), 9µf 2 (0;1] s.t. q(µ) = q¤(1)
8µ 2 [µf;1]. Also, since q(:) is continuous and q(0) = 0, 9µl s.t. q(µl) = q¤(µl) and q(µ) > q¤(µ)
8µ 2 (µl;1).
Let us show that the value of the objective can be strictly increased by replacing the
quantity schedule q(:) with modi¯ed quantity schedule qm(:) s.t. qm(µ) = q(µ) 8µ 2 [0;µl], and
qm(µ) = q¤(µ) 8µ 2 [µl;1].
First, from the de¯nition of r(µ) it follows that r(µ) · µ 8µ 2 [0;1].35 Therefore, 8µ 2
(µl;1), q(µ) > qm(µ) ¸ q¤(r(µ)), i.e. the solution is in Case 2 and g(µ) = q¤(µ) 8µ 2 [r(µ);1].
Thus, under both the original and the modi¯ed quantity schedule g(µ) is the same 8µ 2 [0;1].
Inspecting the objective in (6) it is easy to see that its value increases as a result of this
modi¯cation, because the value of the ¯rst integral goes up, while the second integral remains
unchanged.
Step 5 q(µ) = qsb(µ) on [µh;1].
Since q(:) is strictly increasing and is in Case 2 on [µh;1), it is given by the solution to
(36). From q(1) = q¤(1), it follows that k2 = 0 on this interval, and hence q(µ) = qsb(µ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 11. De¯ne z(µ) = q(µ)¡q¤(r(µ)) and let µ1 = minfµ > 0 : z(µ) ¸ 0g. It follows
from Lemma 10 that µ1 is well de¯ned. Let µ2 ´ maxfµ > µ1 : z(^ µ) ¸ 0; 8^ µ 2 [µ1;µ]g. Suppose
that, contrary to the statement of Lemma 11, µ2 < 1. By de¯nition of µ1 and µ2, z0(µ1) ¸ 0 and
z0(µ2) · 0. At the same time, the de¯nition of q¤(¢), equation (12), and the fact that (36) holds






[1 + k2 ¡ F(µ)]uqµ(q(µ);µ)
f(µ)
Let !(µ), º(µ), and ´(µ) respectively denote the ¯rst, second and third term in the above expression














































































35This also follows from the di®erential equation (18) and the initial condition r(0) = 0, because by (18) r
0(µ) < 0
if r(µ) > µ.
8The hypothesis that maxµ2[0;1];q2[0;q¤(1)]
uqqµ(q;µ)
uqµ(q;µ) · minfM;Ng implies that the terms mul-
tiplying q0 and r0 in the above expression are nonpositive. Furthermore, the hypothesis that
f(µ)
uq(q;µ)¡c0(q)
uµq(µ;q) is strictly increasing, and the fact that (36) holds for all µ 2 [µ1;µ2], imply that
the sum of the last two terms in the above expression is strictly negative. We therefore have
¹0(µ) < 0 8µ 2 [µ1;µ2], and hence ¹(µ2) < ¹(µ1). The fact that z0(µ1) = q0(µ1)(1¡¹(µ1)) ¸ 0 then
produces the contradiction that z0(µ2) = q0(µ2)(1 ¡ ¹(µ2)) > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 12. The existence of at least one solution to (11) and (12) with the boundary
conditions q(0) = r(0) = 0 and q(1) = 1 follows because the optimal solution, which does exists,
must possess these properties. Now, suppose that there are two pairs of functions (q1(µ);r1(µ))
and (q2(µ);r2(µ)) with these properties.
Lemma 10 implies that for i = 1;2 9µ
f
i > 0 s.t. qi(µ
f
i ) = q¤(ri(µ
f
i )), and 8µ 2 (µ
f
i ;1] qi(µ) ¸









2, because in this case (q1(µ);r1(µ)) would be identical to (q2(µ);r2(µ)).)

















Then there must exist ~ µ 2 (0;µ
f
1] and ²1 > 0 s.t. q1(µ) ¸ q2(µ) 8µ 2 [~ µ;µ
f
1] and q1(µ) < q2(µ)
8µ 2 (~ µ ¡ ²1; ~ µ].
Therefore, q0
1(~ µ) ¸ q0
2(~ µ) and there exists ²2 > 0 s.t. q0
1(µ) > q0
2(µ) 8µ 2 (~ µ ¡ ²2; ~ µ).
By inspection of (11), this implies that 8µ 2 (~ µ ¡ ²2; ~ µ) q¤(r2(µ)) > q1(µ), and so by continuity
q¤(r2(~ µ)) ¸ q1(~ µ).






1), it follows that U1(~ µ) < U2(~ µ), and
so r1(~ µ) > r2(~ µ). But since q¤(r2(µ)) ¸ q2(~ µ), q1(~ µ) = q2(~ µ) and
f(r)(uq(q;r)¡c0(q))
uµ(q;r) is increasing in
r, it follows from (11) that q0
1(~ µ) < q0
2(~ µ). A contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. Given that u(q;µ) = µq ¡
q2
2 , c(q) = 0, and F(µ) = µ, the ¯rst-best and
second-best allocation are given by q¤(µ) = µ and qsb(µ) = maxf2µ ¡ 1;0g, respectively. Also, we
can explicitly solve the de¯ning equation for r which yields r(µ) = µ ¡
U(µ)
q(µ) .
This example satis¯es the conditions of Theorem 4 and Lemmas 11 and 12. Hence, there
exists a unique switchpoint µ such that on [µ;1] the solution is in Case 2 and satis¯es q(µ) =
qsb(µ) = 2µ ¡ 1. On the interval [0;µ) the solution is in Case 1, and is characterized by a pair of





q0(®r + (1 ¡ ®)q) = 2q (47)
By Lemma 12 there is a unique solution to the system (46) and (47)36 satisfying the correct
boundary conditions q(µ) = qsb(µ) = q¤(r(µ)). So, our goal is identify this solution and determine
the boundary point µ.37
36(47) provides another way to ascertain the no-exclusion result in the linear-quadratic case. If µ ´ inffµjq(µ >
0g > 0, then by de¯nition r(µ) = µ. So, 9µk 2 (µ;1) s.t. the solution is in Case 1 on (µ;µk) and has to satisfy (47).






Pick µ 2 (µ;minfµk;µ+
®µ






®µ < 1 and q(:) is non-decreasing,
this inequality can only hold if q(µ) = 0, which contradicts the de¯nition of µ = inffµjq(µ) > 0g.
37It is possible to show directly that the solution switches between Cases 1 and 2 only once. Let µ be the smallest
switching point i.e. q(µ) < r(µ) 8µ 2 (0;µ) and q(µ) ¸ r(µ) 8µ 2 (µ; ~ µ) for some ~ µ 2 (µ;1). By continuity of the
9Our strategy is to guess the structure of the solution. Inspection of the system (46) and
(47) leads to the conjecture that r(µ) = aµ +bq(µ) on the interval [0;µ], for some constants a and
b. Applying this conjecture to (46) and (47) and rearranging we obtain:
µ(®a2 + 2a ¡ 2) = ¡q(µ)(4b + a(1 ¡ ® + ®b)) (48)
Suppose that (48) holds as an identity,38 i.e. ®a2 + 2a ¡ 2 = 0 and (1 ¡ ®)a + 4b + ab® = 0.




® ; b = ¡ 1¡®
4+®aa.






1+2®. By computation we can show
that a < 1 and a + b < 1 8® > 0, so r(µ) < µ. Let y(µ) = ln
q(µ)
µ , so that dy =
dq
q ¡ dµ











c2 ¡ c1ey: (49)
where c0 = ®a =
p




1+2®, and c2 = 2¡®a = 3¡
p
1 + 2®. When
® 6= 4 so that c2 6= 0, we can integrate both sides of this equation to obtain:







where k is a constant of integration. Exponentiating both sides, substituting y(µ) = ln
q(µ)
µ , and
simplifying ¯nally produces an implicit equation for q(µ):















can be solved directly to yield:
µ = h(4)q ¡ q ln(q) (51)
Note that h(®) de¯nes a family of solutions to the system (47)-(46) re°ecting the singularity of
this system at the origin. To determine h(®), we will exploit the fact that only one member of
this family satis¯es the boundary condition q(µ) = q¤(r(µ)) = qsb(µ). Since r(µ) = aµ +bq(µ), the
condition q(µ) = q¤(r(µ)) implies q(µ) = a
1¡bµ. Combining this with the condition q(µ) = qsb(µ) =










For ® = 4, we substitute µ(4) = 3=4 and q(µ(4)) = 2µ(4)¡1 = 1=2 into µ = h(4)q¡q ln(q)





















q(µ) . Thus, µ · r(µ) + q(µ). But q
0(µ) = 2
8µ 2 (µ; ~ µ). Hence, µ < r(µ) + q(µ) and q
0(µ) > r
0(µ) 8µ 2 (µ; ~ µ). So, q(~ µ) > r(~ µ), i.e. the solution cannot switch to
Case 2 at ~ µ. This implies that ~ µ = 1.
38Otherwise, q(µ) must be a linear function of µ, in which case (46) and (47) can be solved to yield q(µ) = µ
3+®
2®
and r(µ) = µ=2. But q(µ) > r(µ), and so we can rule out this possibility.
39Note that µ is decreasing in ®. It converges to 2/3 as ® increases to in¯nity (almost all consumers are `honest'),
and converges to 5/6 as ® decreases to 0 (almost all consumers are strategic).
10Note that only the positive root of equation (50) holds as an equality at µ. So, if 9µ1 2 (0;µ) s.t.
(2¡®=2)µ1¡(1¡®)q(µ1) < 0, then by continuity 9µ2 2 (µ1;µ) satisfying (2¡®=2)µ2¡(1¡®)q(µ2) =











Both (51) and (52) characterize q(:) as an implicit function of µ for given ®. Since these
equations may have multiple roots, we need to establish that q(µ) is well-de¯ned. Start with
® 6= 4. Consider µ(q) as a function of q de¯ned by (52) on [0;q(µ)]. Substitution yields
r(µ(q))¡q = aµ(q)+bq¡q =
p
























Observe that r(µ(q)) ¡ q is strictly concave in q, and r(µ(0)) = 0, while our choice of h(®)
guarantees that r(µ(q(µ))) ¡ q(µ) = 0. Then, by strict concavity, r(µ(q)) ¡ q > 0 8q 2 (0;q(µ)).
Since µ(q) must also satisfy (47), r(µ(q))¡q > 0 implies that µ is strictly increasing in q on [0;q(µ)].
Therefore, on [0;µ] (52) admits a unique increasing continuous solution q(µ) s.t. q(µ) = 2µ ¡ 1
and r(µ) > q(µ;) 8µ 2 (0;µ). Since µ(q) is strictly concave in q, q(µ) is convex. The case ® = 4
can be handled in a similar way.
We have thus found the unique solution to (47) and (46) that satis¯es the condition
q(µ) = qsb(µ) = q¤(r(µ)) for some µ, and hence the solution to Problem (19).
It remains to determine the optimal schedule for the `honest' types. On the interval [µ;1]





Meanwhile, on the interval [0;µ] the solution is in Case 1, so g(µ) = q(r¡1(µ)) on [0;r(µ)]. To
determine g(:) on this interval, note that r(:) is strictly increasing on [0;µ], so its inverse r¡1(µ)











From r(µ) = aµ+bq(µ) it follows that µ = ar¡1(µ)+bg(µ). Substituting this into (53) and solving





1+2®1+1)], use an argument similar to the one establishing these properties for q(µ).
In a similar way, we can compute g(µ) for ® = 4. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2: Fix some ®1 and ®2 s.t. ®1 > ®2 > 0.
Part (i). Instead of q(µ;®), it is more convenient to operate with its inverse - the function µ(q;®)













to show that µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2) when µ is su±ciently small, and that there exists a unique point




1+2®1+1)) s.t. µ(qc(®1;®2);®1) = µ(qc(®1;®2);®2).




1+2®+1)) s.t. µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2) 8q 2 (0;ql).



















11Dividing both sides of this inequality by q
p
1+2®2¡1
























Let q go to zero. Then the left-hand of the above inequality converges to zero. If ®2 > 2, then





second term is bounded. If ®2 < 2, then the ¯rst term on the right-hand side converges to zero,
while the second remains is a positive and constant. So, the inequality holds when q is su±ciently
small.









2 · q (3=2 + log(1=2) ¡ log(q))
It is easy to see that this inequality holds for small q after we divide both sides of it by q, and
then let q go to zero.
If ®1 = 4, then we need to show that










To see that this inequality holds for small q, we divide both sides of it by q
p
1+2®2¡1
2 , and let q go
to zero.




1+2®1+1)], ²1 > 0 and ²2 > 0 s.t.
µ(qi;®1) = µ(qi;®2), µ(q;®1) > µ(q;®2) 8q 2 (qi;qi +²1), and µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2) 8q 2 (qi;qi ¡²2).














Step 3. If µqq(q1;®1) · µqq(q1;®2), then µqq(q2;®1) < µqq(q2;®2) 8q2 > q1, where µqq(q;®) is the
second derivative of µ(q;®) with respect to q. This step follows by simple computation.





Let qi be the smallest q s.t. µ(qi;®1) = µ(qi;®2). Then by Step 1 µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2)
8q 2 (0;qi), and so µq(qi;®1) ¸ µq(qi;®2). To ¯nalize the proof, consider two cases.
Case 2. 9²1 > 0 s.t. µ(q;®1) > µ(q;®2) 8q 2 (qi;qi + ²1). Then µq(qi;®1) > µq(qi;®2).




1+2®1+1)) s.t. µ(qr;®1) = µ(qr;®2), let us choose the smallest such qr. So,
µ(q;®1) > µ(q;®2) for q 2 (qi;qr). Therefore, µq(qr;®1) · µq(qr;®2). But since µq(qi;®1) >
µq(qi;®2), we conclude that 9qm 2 [qi;qr] s.t. µqq(qm;®1) · µqq(qm;®2). But then by Step 3
µqq(q;®1) < µqq(q;®2) 8q > qm.
Consequently, µq(q;®1) < µq(q;®2) 8q > qr, and so µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2) 8q > qr. But this









Case 1. 9²1 > 0 s.t. µ(q;®1) · µ(q;®2) 8q 2 (qi;qi + ²1).
Then µq(qi;®1) = µq(qi;®2) and µqq(qi;®1) · µqq(qi;®2), and so by Step 3, µqq(q;®1) <
µqq(q;®2) 8q > qi. Hence, µq(q;®1) < µq(q;®2) and, consequently, µ(q;®1) < µ(q;®2) 8q > qi.









Part (ii). Recall that U(µ;®) ´ µq(µ;®) ¡ ts(µ;®) is the total surplus of a `strategic' consumer
with valuation µ. We have established that U(µ;®) =
R µ
0 q(s;®)ds.
12Since q(µ;®1) > q(µ;®2) 8µ 2 (0;µc(®1;®2), we also have U(µ;®1) > U(µ;®2) 8µ 2
(0;µc(®1;®2).
Let us show that U(µ(®2);®1) > U(µ(®2);®2). Note that µ(®2) > µ(®1), and r(µ(®2);®2) >
r(µ(®1);®1). Combining these inequalities and invoking Lemma 8, we conclude that g(µ(®2);®1) =
g(µ(®2);®2) = µ(®2).













r(µ(®2)). So, U(µ(®2);®1) >
U(µ(®2);®2).
Further, U(µ;®1) > U(µ;®2) 8µ 2 [µc(®1;®2);µ(®2)], because Uµ(µ;®1) = q(µ;®1) <
q(µ;®2) = Uµ(µ;®2) on this interval. Finally, U(µ;®1) > U(µ;®2) 8µ 2 [µ(®2);1] because
Uµ(µ;®1) = q(µ;®1) = 2µ ¡ 1 = q(µ;®2) = Uµ(µ;®2) on this interval.
Part (iii).
Step 1. 9µm > 0 s.t. 8µ 2 (0;µm) g(µ;®1) > g(µ;®2).
Using an argument identical to the one in Step 1 of Part (i) in this proof, we can prove
an equivalent result - if g is small enough, then µ(g;®1) < µ(g;®2).
Step 2. g(µ;®1) > g(µ;®2) 8µ 2 [r(µ(®1);®1);r(µ(®2);®2)).








1+2®2+1), g(µ;®1) = µ
8µ ¸ r(µ(®1);®1) and g(µ;®2) < µ 8µ 2 (0;r(µ(®2);®2)).
Step 3. If 9µ 2 [µm;r(µ(®1);®1)] s.t. g(µ;®1) · g(µ;®2), then 9µ1;µ2 2 [µm;r(µ(®1);®1)],
µ1 · µ2 and ± > 0, s.t. (i) g(µ1;®1) = g(µ1;®2) and g(µ;®1) > g(µ;®2) 8µ 2 (µ1 ¡ ±;µ1); (ii)
g(µ2;®1) = g(µ2;®2) and g(µ;®1) > g(µ;®2) 8µ 2 (µ2;µ2+±). Consequently, gµ(µ1;®1) · gµ(µ1;®2)
and gµ(µ2;®1) ¸ gµ(µ2;®2). The proof of this step is obvious.




r¡1(µ;®)¡µ 8µ 2 (0;r(µ(®1);®1)) .
To see this, di®erentiate g(µ;®) ´ q(r¡1(µ;®);®) and use (46) to make a substitution.
Step 5. r¡1(µ1;®1) > r¡1(µ1;®2).
Since g(µ1;®1) = g(µ1;®2) and gµ(µ1;®1) · gµ(µ1;®2), Step 4 implies that r¡1(µ1;®1) ¸
r¡1(µ1;®2).
This inequality must be strict, i.e. r¡1(µ1;®1) 6= r¡1(µ1;®2). To see this, rewrite
r(µ;®) = µ ¡
U(µ;®)
q(µ;®) as µ = r¡1(µ;®) ¡
U(r¡1(µ;®);®)





q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2) . But q(r¡1(µ1;®1);®1) = g(µ1;®1) = g(µ1;®2) =
q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2), yet U(r¡1(µ1;®1);®1) > U(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2) as established above. Contradic-
tion.
Step 6. r¡1(µ1;®2) > µc(®1;®2).
Note that q(r¡1(µ1;®1);®1) = g(µ1;®1) = g(µ1;®2) = q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2). But by Step
5, r¡1(µ1;®1) > r¡1(µ1;®2). So, since q(µ;®) is strictly increasing in µ, q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®1) <
q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2), and hence r¡1(µ1;®2) > µc(®1;®2).
Step 7. r¡1(µ2;®2) ¸ r¡1(µ2;®1).
To see this, combine gµ(µ2;®1) ´
q(r¡1(µ2;®1);®1)
r¡1(µ2;®1)¡µ2 ¸ gµ(µ1;®2) ´
q(r¡1(µ1;®2);®2)
r¡1(µ2;®2)¡µ2 with the
fact that q(r¡1(µ2;®1);®1) ´ g(µ2;®1) = g(µ2;®2) ´ q(r¡1(µ2;®2);®2).
Step 8. Since r¡1(µ2;®2) ¸ r¡1(µ2;®1) > µc(µ1;µ2), it follows that g(µ2;®2) ´ q(r¡1(µ2;®2);®2) >
g(µ2;®1) ´ q(r¡1(µ2;®1);®1). However, by assumption g(µ2;®2) = g(µ2;®1). This contradiction
implies that g(µ;®1) > g(µ;®2) 8µ 2 (0; 1
3 + 2
3(
p
1+2®2+1)). Q.E.D.
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